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NEGOTIATING A COMMERCIAL "MOST FAVORED NATION"
CLAUSE
Stirling Adams *

The business lawyer's role in evaluating and negotiating a commercial
"most favored nation" (MFN) commitment is to maximize its potential benefits
to the client and to eliminate its potential pitfalls. This article discusses the
specific business factors and forms of an MFN clause that can make the commitment either an unwise infringement on corporate decision making or an acceptable agreement that furthers a client's long-term objectives.
After summarizing events from the nineteenth century British "Opium
War" with China to show the context in which MFN clauses were developed
between nations, section A discusses the business justifications that may underlie
a buyer's request for MFN status. Section B explores reasons an MFN clause may
be impractical or inappropriate due to administrative difficulties, restrictions on
corporate decision making, or antitmst issues. Section C is a summary, in
checklist form, of the common negotiation points that should be considered when
dealing with a commercial MFN clause, with drafting and negotiating tips. Most
large clients arc both suppliers in many commercial rclationships and buyers in
many others. Much of the discussion in this article focuses on the supplier's
perspective, but thc analyses can also inform a buyer's drafting and negotiating
decisions.
'Stirling Aualn, i, currcntly in-hou,c counsel for a global solhvare company. where he splits his
time between negotiating technology transactions anu advising his company's Latin America subsidiaries.
Stirling received a B.S in Statistics and Computer Science Irom BYU and a J.D. from the Boston University
School of Law. where he graduated cum laude and was named Edward F. Hennessey Distinguished Scholar of
Law.
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across an MFN clause while

reviewing a supply contract, she may understandably wonder if she is reading
one of the treaties resulting from the nineteenth century Opium Wars fought by
')

the British against China. In the early 1800s, due largely to British opium
imports, China faced a serious epidemic of opium addiction. Though China had
outlawed opium, Britain, in what historian John Fairbanks calls "the most longcontinucd and systematic international crime of modern times," encouraged
British drug merchants to impOli it into China. I In 1839 China confiscated and
destroyed over twenty thousand easks of illegal opium, required foreign
importers to sign a commitment not to impOli opium, and threatened to arrest a
prominent British smuggler. The British treated this as aggression against Britain
and declared war. The British claimed the Chinese could only enforce anti-opium
laws against domestic drug users and dealers: the property of foreign opium
importers and traders should not be afTected."
The ensuing "First Opium War" almost ended in early 1842 after
superior British war technology led to Chinese military defeat. However, when
the Chinese refused to reimburse Britain $6,000,000 for the illegal opium that
had been confiscated, Britain burned several more Chinese cities. The war
concluded with ratification of the Treaty of Nanking in late 1842. Pursuant to the

I See 10 THF CAMflKIIl(;c HIS JOKY Of CIII:--IA: VOLUML II: LATL CII'IN(;, 1800 1911, PAKI I 114
(John K. Fairbanks cd., Cambridge University Pn"s 197H).

2 Jel. at 187 88; JACK BlH'IIIN(i, TIlE CHI:--IESE OPIl'M W~RS 77 81 (Hutchinson & Co. 1977). A
potential modern day equivalent to this would be for Colombia to claim that the United States could not interdict
shipments of cocaine imported into the U.S.; instead, the U.S. could only exercise ib police powers against
domestic cocaine users and dealers.
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tenns of treaty China paid $21,000,000 to Britain, ceded the island of Hong Kong
to British rule, and, importantly for our purposes, granted Britain "most favored
nation" trading status.
On the last point, the treaty's MFN clause stated that if the Chinese were
to grant any trading privileges or immunities to any subjects of non-British
foreign countries, "the same privileges and immunities will be extended to and
enjoyed by British Subjects .... ".1 In drafting this clause, the British drew on a
feature of treaty negotiation they had utilized for at least four

centuries.~

In 1844, under threat from a U.S. warship, the Chinese signed the
Wangxia Treaty with the United States.' Weeks later the French extracted the
Whampoa Treaty using leverage from the threat of eight French warships. These
two treaties contained trade privileges similar to those gained by Britain in the
Treaty of Nanking, including an MFN clause, and even a provision granting
foreign nationals immunity from Chinese law. 6
What does the First Opium War and the resulting MFN clauses forced on
China have to do with a lawyer's review of a supply contract? More than one
might initially think. The MFN clauses pushed on nineteenth century China had

3 Supplementary Treaty of the Bogue, Oct. X, I X43, P.R.C.-U.K., art. VIII. This "Supplementary
Treaty" was an amendment to the Treaty of Nanking.

4 See Akiko Yanai. The FUllctioll of fhe MFN Claus!! ill IllI! Globlll Tradillg 5rsfem (IDE APEC
Study Ctr., Working Paper Series 01102 No.3, Mar. 20(2) (describing an MFN clause in a treaty between
England and Bourgogne in 1417) (ll'illlhI!! (/1 htlp:llwww.ide.gojp/Japanese/Publish/Apec/pdt/apec 13 wp3.pdf
(last visited Jan. 2X, 2(05).
5 Hongshan Li, MlIlIlIgillg Diploll/lllic Crisis Il'ilh Educilliollill Exchange: COI'(TIIII/<'1/1 (11,,1 Us.Chillil Cllllllmi RefllliollS, 1!J()5 1!J50, Paper delivered at the 16th International Congress of Historical
Sciences, Aug. 25 -Sept. I, 19X5 at 3 7 (19H5). III http://www.osI02000.uio.no/program/papcrs/sI6/sI6hongshanli.pdf (last visited Jan. 2R, 20(5).
6 Sue Gronewold, Thl' Opillm /1'ill' IIl1d Forl'igll Ellcl'OlIcllllll'lIl (1977), {I/ http://atc.easia. columbia.
edu/china/modern/opiulll.htm (iast visited Jan. 2X, 20(5): .I'l'l' also BFECHIMi, sllpra note 2, at 172--74 (detailing
the background to these treaties in greater depth).

81

INTERNATIONAL LAW

&

MANAGEMENT REVIEW

Spring 2005

much thc same goal as today's commercial contract MFN clause: the party asking
for MFN status demands that it be guaranteed pricing or other privileges at least
as good as those the other party offers to any third party. Some historians refer to
the treaties resulting from the First Opium War as the "Unequal Treaties,"7 and
the Chinese came to refer to the Treaty of Nanking as a "national humiliation."x
The treaty severely diminished China's right of sovereign rule in its own
territory; for example, China was limited in its ability to alter tariffs,4 and it could
not even control importation of illegal drugs. Similarly, without care in negotiation, a commercial MFN clause can become an "unequal contract," a "corporate
humiliation," and can diminish a client's ability to control its own business
operations.
Of course, an MFN clause is not always a unilateral provIsIon forced
onto a weaker entity by a dominant party. As an example of this, the current
standard in international trade agreements is that an M FN clause's obligations
and benefits arc reciprocal. An early instance of this is the 1654 treaty between
Great Britain and Sweden, which stipulated that each country's citizens would
enjoy the same privileges while in the other country "as any other foreigner at
present doth, or hereafter shall enjoy there."11i In the 1940s, as paJi of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), dozens of countries agreed to grant
MFN status regarding tariffs to signing countries; they simultaneously received

7 See. e.g., TilL CAMIlRJ[)(iic HIS lORY 01 ('IIINA. s"pm note I. at eh. 5.
8 See, e.g .. PETlR WARD

"\Y.

Til[ 01'11:\1 WAR, 1840 1842: BARIl.\RIANS I:--J 1111· CElI'SIIAL hll'lRf
IN THE EARLY PART OF TilE NINI' lH'N fll ('EN lUln AND Till' WAR llY WHICH THl'Y FORCHl HER (jAILS AJAR xiv
(Univ. ofN.C. Press, rev. cd. 1998).

9 The treaty with the U.S. even stated that China could not raise its import duties without U.S.
permission. Sec LI, s"pm note 5.

10 See Yanai, slipra note 4, at 3.
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MFN status from the other signing countries. The GATT's successor is the World
Trade Organization (WTO), and in 200 I China, once victimized by forced unilateral MFN clauses, willingly signed onto the WTO's mutual MFN obligations. As
of Cambodia's joining in October 2004, 148 countries have joined the WTO,
thereby signing up to reciprocal MFN commitments and benefits. I I

II. EVALUATING AND NEGOTIATING A COMMERCIAL MFN CLAUSE
The following MFN clause was proffered by a large financial services
company to a telecommunications hardware supplier. In it the buyer sought an
MFN commitment that would apply broadly to any sales by the supplier to other
customers, or even to distributors.
Most Favored Customer. Supplier warrants that the prices
offered to Buyer are no less favorable than any terms currently
agreed to or that will be agreed to by Supplier with any other
customer or distributor. If during the Agreement Supplier or any
of its distributors enters into an agreement with any other
customer that contains more favorable pricing than is provided
hereunder, then this Agreement shall be deemed amended to
provide Buyer such more favorable pricing on a retroactive
basis. To ensure compliance, Buyer may bi-annuallY audit
Supplier's records upon 7 days written notice. Supplier will
reimburse Buyer retroactively for the savings Buyer should have
received but for Buyer's failure to comply with this clause. 11

II For details on the number of WTO members and the dates of China's and Nepal's membership,
see http://,,,,,,,wto.mg. (last visited Apr, 27, 2(0)), In 199R, U ,S, government trade agencies began using the
term "Normal Trade Relations" (NTR) status instead of"MFN status," The stated reason "as that since a large
majority of U,S, trading partners had MFN status, it was more accurate to use the NTR terln, See U,S,
TREASIIRY, N()R~tAI. TRADe RFI.A1IOt-;S, (/, hllp:!lwww.itds,treas.gov/mtil.html (last visited Apr. 27, 20(5),An
unstated reason t,)r the name change was that some U,S, legislators had ditliculty granting "most favored
nation" status to communist China; ironic, given that the U,S, pressured China into granting the U,S, MFN
status 150 years earlier. See .I'llpru text accompanying note 5,

12 These clauses arc used with permission of the supplier, who requested that the companies' names
be withheld,
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For the business reasons explained below, this clause is

110t

representative of the

content of most MFN clauses found in commercial contracts today. In this particular situation, an MFN clause was agreed to by the parties, but the final text
matched the following:
Most Favored Customer. Supplier walTants that the prices under
this agreement are equal to or less than standard prices offered
by Supplier generally to similarly situated customers contracting
for similar volumes under the same terms and conditions. 13
The discussion below analyzes the business context and negotiation
factors counsel should consider in either modifying or completely avoiding a
proposed MFN clause, with the assumption that at the end of a negotiation the
client's situation should more closely match that ofWTO-member China in 200 I
than the MFN-victimized China of 1842.
When negotiating an MFN or othcr relatively unfamiliar contract clause,
it is helpful for the lawyer to collect some intelligence regarding the purpose,
impact, and business context of the clause, particularly when she may not be
completely familiar with business and contracting practices within the client's
industry. This often means reviewing contracts in which the same or other
companies have addressed similar issues. The discussion that follows uses text
from actual commercial contracts. Several websites provide easy access to, and
searching capability within, thousands of contracts that public companies have
included as part of filings before the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,

13 !d.
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and thousands more contracts are available
contract

111

other private and govemment

archives.l~

A. Examining the Potential Business Just(jicationsfor all MFN
Before negotiating specific clements of a buyer-proposed MFN clause,
the supplier's lawyer should first ask whether any MFN clause would be
appropriate given the proposed business relationship. In some situations, the
answer may be obvious. For nineteenth century China, the objective in accepting
the MFN-Iaden Unequal Treaties was to avoid ransacking and pillaging by the
British, the Americans, and the French. ls When reviewing an MFN clause today,
the lawyer should at least understand the business context at hand; does the
relationship between the parties justify an MFN commitment? Tn many circumstances, the best negotiation result is complete exclusion of an MFN clause.

14 Conlracls conlained in SEC filing:s (redacled of those paris Ihat a tiling company designates as
confidcntial) arc mailable at hltp:/iwww.sec.gov/cgi-bin/srch-edgar (last visited Apr. 27. 2005). It can be time
consuming to locate a contract on this website without a specitic company and tiling date or document type.
Findlaw.com is one of several web sites that has also published many tiled contracts from the SEC database and
organized them by industry and contract type. and these arc available at http://contracts.corporate.tindlaw.com/
(last visited Apr. 27, 2(05). The University of Missouri's Contracting and Organizations Research Institute
makes available over 22,000 contracts. mostly extracted ti'om the SEC database, and these are available at
http://cori.missouri.edui (last visited Apr. 27, 20(5). Three government procurement sites that provide access to
many contracts between state agencies and private suppliers arc: http://ww\V.ogs.state.ny.us/purchase (New
York) (last visited Apr. 27.20(5). http://procure.ohio.gov/ proc/index.asp (Ohio) (last visited Apr. 27. 2(05),
and http://fcn.state.tl.us/stcontracts (Florida) (last visited Apr. 27. 20(5).
15 In 1840 the British publication the Illdia Gil~~lfe described a British attack on the city of Chousan as fl)lIows:
A more complete pillage could not be conceived than took place. Every house was
broken open. every drawer and box ransacked, the streets strewn with fragments of
fiJrniture. pictures. tables. chairs. grain of all sorts the whole set otT by the dead or the
living bodies of those who had been unable to leave the city from the wounds received
ti'om our merciless guns .... The plunder ceased only when there was nothing to take or
destroy.
BHCHI!'JCi, .I'llI'm note 2. at 116, citing the India Ga::eI/('. Jack !leeching. in Tm CHI!'JCSE OPlll~l WARS. refers
previously used in an
to this incident and writes: "This was the occasion atkr which the Hindi word III/
English tlJflll only hesitantly. and with inverted commas - became tinllly established in the language, as 100/."

Id
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The following, roughly ordered by both frequency and importance, are
the most common business justifications given for a buyer seeking an MFN
clause:

I. Buyer :\. volume commitment
A buyer's commitment to purchase a large volume can lead to an
accompanying request for an MFN commitment. A buyer might tell a supplier,
essentially, "I will be your largest customer and buy more from you than any
other customer. Therefore, I deserve to be guaranteed your best price." An
example of how this concept can play out in an MFN clause comes from a 2001
Microsoft agreement to provide Expedia digital map services:
Most Favored Nation. Microsoft will not charge Expcdia a price
for Services rendered under this Agreement . . . that is less
favorable than the rates charged . . . to any third party unless
such third party agrees to use MapPoinLNet Maps more
frequently than Expedia's then current actual usage of
MapPoint.Net Maps.11l
The justification for the clause was Expedia's usage volume; consequently, the
MFN obligation did not apply where Microsoft contracted with a customer that
made a greater volume commitment. Similarly, in contracting with Hewlett
Packard for computer systems, Ncw York Statc obtained an MFN commitmcnt
that only applied when HP sold to a third party "substantially the same or a
smaller quantity of a com mod ity." 17

16 AMENDED At\Jl RESTATED MAP Sf,RVI·.R

liCLNSF A(iRFlMcN r Hfc I\I'ITN MICROSOFT CORPORAl 10'1
(Aug.
15, 20(1). hllp://colltracts.corporate.filldlaw.coilliagreeill
cllts/cxpedia:ll1stt.ll1ap.200 I.O~.15.htIl11 (last visited .Iall. 2X, 20(5).
AND

EXPrDIA.

\"".,

cl.

4.3

17 HEIILLrr PACKAIW - S\SII,MS 11t\J) PlRIPlllcRALS COt\IR.\CI (July 20,199-+),
http://www.ogs.state.lly.usipurchasc/slltiawardllotesI75006533eprices.htll1(lastvisited.lall. 2X, 20(5) (the
contract was originally signed between the state of New York and Compaq).

86

Issue I

Commercial Most Favored Nation Clauses

2. Dominant hargaining position
A related justification is based partly in simple, brute economic force. A
large buyer may have the economic clout to tell a supplier, "If you don't <fgree to
give us your best prices, we won't buy from you." This negotiating stance is more
likely to occur with large governments or companies with centralized purchasing
organizations. As an example, the State of Ohio's purchasing office includes the
following "Economic Price Adjustment" clause in its standard language for
contracting directly with suppliers:
The State will be entitled to a price decrease any time the
Contractor or any of its distributors sells a product or a service
to any similarly situated most favored customer for less than the
price agreed to between the State and the Contractor under this
Contract. I x
Even if unstated, a usual assumption behind a large buyer's request for
special pricing treatment is that the supplier will be significantly benefited by
entering into a direct supply contract with the customer's purchasing office. Once
the contract is in place, the assumption is that the suppl ier will have easier selling
access to the hundreds of individual subsidiaries or office locations of a company
or the many agencies or municipalities of a government. The supplier's attorney
needs to understand this assumption: it may not be valid in many situations. To
start with, much of the buycr's purchasing potential may be exhausted by the
transaction at hand. In addition, even if the buying company is sufficiently large,
with many potential purchasing locations, an MFN clause may be irrelevant to

IX SIAII 01 01110 ()lrARr~lr'Jl OF A"~II'JISIRA"\'I Sl R"IUS. Snrr TFRM SCIII·mILie
S&LGB.\SFD. Economic Pricc Adjustmcnt cl. (.Junc i. 2003 I. http://procurc.ohio.go\"/pdtislg06-0i-OJ.pdf(last visitcd
Jan. 2X. 2(0)) [hcrcinatlcr SIAII 01 Ollioi.
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the supplier's ability to make sales across the enterprise if the locations do not
share purchasing processes.

3. Preserve a competitive advantage
If the buyer is providing a manufacturer with intellectual property or
other resources necessary for the manufacturing process, an MFN commitment
may be sought to preserve the buyer's competitive advantage regarding those
resources. A manufacturing agreement between Avanex, a.flrovider of photonic
processors to telecommunications companics, and manufacturer Concord MicroOptics, Inc. (eMI) provides an example. Avanex provided eMI with the training,
confidential information, and intellcctual property to enable eM! to manufacture
photonie components designed by Avanex. Avanex owned all of the intellectual
property developed or resulting from the manufacturing process and could
therefore have chosen to preclude eMI from selling the components to Avanex
competitors. The agreement however, allowed sales to third parties (perhaps to
create cost savings through large-scale production). Under the circumstances, to
preserve a competitive price advantage for Avanex, the agreement included an
unqualified MFN clause stating, "CM! shall guarantee Avanex a [percentage
redacted] discount to the lowest prices at which it offers Products to third parties
... in any other agreement that may hereafter be entered into by CMI."19 Without
this clause, Avanex would have effectively subsidized its competition by
allowing CMI to sell to Avanex competitors-without price or other restrictions-components Avanex had designed and financed, and for which Avanex

19 AVANEX CUJ{P()J{AIIUN, LIClcNSl AND SUPPLY A(;RU:\I[~I. Ex. A (May g,
http://contracts.corporatc.tindlaw.comiagrcclllcnts/avancxiliccilscagt.html( last visitcd Jan. 2X, 20(5).
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owned the intellectual property and other resources neccssary for their manufacture.

4. Sole-source hidding
Many government cntities and large corporations have a defined
purchasing process that includes putting larger buys out for competitive bidding.
If, instead, a purchase is made after soliciting a price from only a single, or "sole
source" bidder, the customer may argue that it needs an MFN guarantee as an
assurance that it has received a competitive price. The MFN clause in the
Canadian government's standard language for a sole source software license
purchase provides an example:
The Offeror certifies that the price quoted is not in excess of the
lowest price normally charged anyone else in Canada, including
its most favored Canadian customer, for like quality and quantity
of the Software Products and Related Services. . . . 20
Though this clause docs not guarantee that the bidder's price is less than that of
any competitors, it provides the customer some assurance that the price is fair and
comparable to similar sales to other buyers within the specified gcographical
location.

5. Rewardfor risk: lock-in and switching costs
Where the buyer takes a significant business risk in making a major
purchase, it may seek MFN status in compensation, particularly if the buyer's
risk is in direct proportion to the supplier's gain. For example, in implementing

20

sO[' I WAH,

ACC)lIISI flO'J

RHTRI''J( f'

DFPARf\1IcNTAL l'JIlIVllll>\L SIANIlI'J(; 0111'1{

(DISO)

CI'J IRI·.

FOR

Till'

OR lIM11 H) Tf'NDERII':C; Sm fll'ARc Sf',RVlnS SOl L!1I0NS) ci.

RH)IIISI

SIIPP!)' 01

CI

lOR

ASS

I

S fA 'JIJII':(;
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A

Sou, SOL;Rn RFQl!IRLMFNIS

('.2.5.4. http://sotlwarc.pwgsc.gc.ca/rfso/rfsoscc-

tions/scction2c-c.ctin (iasl modified Scpt. 22. 2(04).
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the supplier's product or service, the buyer may experience significant "lock-in"
due to high switching costS. 2 ! The buyer's switching costs can give the supplier
an advantage in pricing negotiations in future years because of the high costs
associated with switching suppliers. Thus, prior to allowing itself to be "lockedin," such buyers may seek an MFN clause as a protection against future price
lI1creases.

6. Network eff(ects
Where a buyer's purchase ofa product or service benefits the supplier by
substantially increasing the network effect for the product or serviee,22 the buyer
may argue that its contribution to the supplier's success is deserving of an extra
pricing benefit such as MFN status. For example, a manufacturer with a new data
storage technology that competes with DVD's may make a significant sale to a
movie distribution company. The manufacturer is benefited by the initial
purchase, but it may receive a much greater benefit when the buyer makes
movies available to consumers on the new technology. As the number of content
providers and consumers that usc the new technology (the "network") grows, the
value of the new technology increases.

21 "Lock-in" occurs when a buyer has to invest in assets in order to make use of a product or service,
and would experience signiticant '"switching costs" if it changed to a competing product or service. For
example, a company might get '"locked-in" to one supplier's voice-over IP telecommunications solution if in
order to move to a competing solution thc company would have significant switching costs of purchasing new
telephoncs. adapters. switchcs, and other hardware. training personnel on using the new system. installing the
nc\v

~ystcm,

training users or support personnel on lIsing the new sy:-.tcl11. and other logislical

mattcr~.

for a

detailed discussion of when lock-in and switching costs occur. and how to cause or a\oid these phenomena, see
CARL SHAPtRO & HAL R. VARtAN. INnJRMMtON RLLlS: A STRA1HdC GUtDE 10 I HI· NL m'OR" Eco"o~1\ 11-·13,
103-72 (Harvard Bus. School Press 1998).
22 A "network etTect" exists when, as with many communications and consumer technology
products, the value of a product to its uscrs depends signiticantly on how many other people have it and use it.
Se(' id. at 13 15, 45·-47. 173 225, For example. if you have and use email but few of your tillnily members.
friends, or business colleagues do, the value to you of the email program is extremely limited.
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7. Ensure ':tflir" pricing

In multiyear contracts and in many industries where companies'
products, business models, and pricing are subject to change, a buyer may seck
an MFN clause to give it a level of confidence that the buyer's pricing and service
level will continue to be competitive because it will be at least as good as the
pricing other buyers receive. For example, in a ten-year contract for cable
services, the town of Keyport, Connecticut, sought an MFN commitment from
Cablevision to guarantee that over thc contract life the town would receive
service or pricing improvements or upgrades that were provided to neighboring
towns. n
Most of the above justifications for seeking MFN status result simply
from the buyer seeking to negotiate the best possible price for the contract.
Ensuing negotiations frequently include discussions based in the specific context
of the transaction regarding whether the agreement-without the MFN clausealready represents a favorable price. Section C below contains suggestions on
negotiating points for both parties regarding potential justifications for an MFN
clause.

B. Potential MFN Prohlems-Impracticality. COl11petitil'e Harm. Antitrust Risks
Within the context of a specific transaction, there may be a legitimate
reason for a buyer to seek a price benefit such as an MFN clause. However, in
order to determine whether an MFN clause should be negotiated or simply
rejected, the supplier needs to consider whether granting MFN status may create

23 Doug Mckenzie. Kel'l'orl Reodl' 10 Figlzl C"hle CiOI1I, THE I~[)ol'.. May 24, 2000. at I, http://
indepcndenLglllncws.col11/Ncws/2000/0524/Front Page/tn4.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2(05).
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negative repercussions for the supplier. Three circumstances where this may
occur are when the MFN commitment creates an administrative impracticality
for the supplier, when it leaves the supplier open to competitive harm, and when
it places the supplier at risk of violating antitrust laws.

1. Admil1istrative impracticality or impossibility
Suppose the proposed MFN clause is similar to the following eommitment found in the State of Ohio's boilerplate supply contract:
Any time the Contractor or any of its distributors sells a product
or provides a service to any customer or dealer for less than it is
then available to the State under this Contract, the Contractor
must notify the State of that cvent within thirty (30) calendar
days of its occurrence and immediately reduce the price of the
affected goods or services to the State under this Contract. 24
For many companies, because of complexity in their pricing practices and the
lack of control-or even awareness-of channel pricing, it would be impractical,
if not commercially impossible, to avoid breaching this obligation. In various
industries (such as food, pharmaccutical, and electronics) a sale to the end user is
made after the product passes at least through one level of a distribution supply
chain or channel. For example, a computer manufaeturcr's basic channel
typically includes distributors, OEMs,25 and various flavors of resellers (system
intcgrators, value added resellcrs, online rcscllers, sales agents, ctc.).
Often, each level of a distribution channel is offercd pricing unique to
that level. For example, a manufacturer's price for telephony software is likely to
be different for each distributor (that may act mainly as a shipping and collection
24 SO!

STATE

m

01110. slIl'ra

note IX.

25 An "OEM" i, an original equipment manuf'lcturer that bundle, another company's product with
its own. For example, an automobile manufacturer is an OEM of the airbag it includes in its vehicles.
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agent), hardware OEMs that bundle the software with its equipment, system
integrators that include the software as one of many parts of its busincss telecommunications solution, resellers that simply sell the software in an online store,
and-most obviously-end user customers. For each of the potential parties, the
supplier may establish a different price based in part upon matters such as how
much of the storage, shipment, and collection burden the channel member
assumes, and on how much purchase volume the buyer commits to.
All of this complexity results in a common factual circumstance where a
supplicr may not know the prices at which each member of its channel sells an
item. In fact, once a company has sold a product to a distributor or other channel
member, it· cannot set or control the minimum price at which the product is
resold-to do so would be illegal "price fixing."26 Furthermore, even ifno distribution channel is involved, the number of customer contracts a company
develops over time can easily number in the thousands or tens of thousands.
Unless its pricing processes are centralizcd with little variation, the supplier
company simply may be unable to track the various prices at whieh it offers its
products.

2. Freedom to compete The initial problem with the Ohio MFN clause example
is simply that a supplier may not be able to comply with the clause due to the
difficulty of administering the commitment. Another serious problem with the
commitment is that even if the supplier could be aware of its pricing for all

26 [n antitrust parlance such action would he considered "vertical price fixing" or "resale price
maintenance:' an activity found to be inherently in violation of antitrust laws in an early U.S. Supreme Court
price-fixing decision. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911). This conclusion
has been repeatedly upheld in subsequent decades. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Servo Corp., 465 U.S. 752
(1984); Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers' Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminul11, Inc., 45 U.S. 97 (1980).
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transactions at various distribution points, in many-even most-situations the
clause should not be accepted because it may handcuff the supplier in future
business decisions that may be necessary to compete in the market on an ongoing
basis.
Typically, a supplier needs to retain flexibility to modify its pricing and
other elements of its business model in order to remain competitive over time. In
line with this, when the town of Keyport, Connecticut, sought an MFN commitment from Cablcvision in a ten-year contract for cable services, Cablevision's
firm response was that "we can't accept the favored nation clause. . . . If we
agree to the provision we'd have to do it everywhere. Eventually we would have
one rate, and our competitors can set their rates, leaving us hamstrung."27
A supplier's need for pricing flexibility may be most obvious when
considering its distribution model. As discussed above, the supplier will vary its
pricing for different distribution channels, in part to reflect the different services
the channel members provide to the supplier. If an MFN clause forces a supplicr
to price its product the same for its various typcs of channcl members and end
users, it can break the company's pricing modcl. As onc example of this, a
channel member is much less likely to aggressively promote, or to even carry or
sell, a supplier's products if thc cnd user can get the same products directly from
the supplier at a price near, equal to, or better than what the channel member itself
pays for the products.
Even if the text in the Ohio clause refelTing to distributors and dealers
were removed and the term "customer" were clarified to exclude channel sales,

27 S(!(! Mckenzie. slIpra nole 23.
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for some suppliers an acute problem with the MFN clause is that it applies to any
sale to "any customer." A business reality is that in many companies sharp
variations in pricing occur without even taking the channel into account. These
might include tcmporary promotional priccs to introducc a product (perhaps to
brcak into a competitive market) or to reduce inventory, or special discounts
ncgotiated to meet end-of-year company or individual sales quotas. If a supplier
has made MFN commitments that could force it to pass special pricing to existing
customers, the supplier may have foreclosed its ability to address specific market
needs with custom pricing.
The following are some of the reasons a supplier may prIce its
products/services differently for different customers.

a. International sales. Some suppliers price products and services differently in different countries. A common motivation for this is that consumer,
business, and government purchasing power may vary significantly by country
and region. For example, a pharmaccutical manufacturer might offer a drug in
some countries for one-tenth of the price offered to U.S. buyers. Concern for
international pricing variation is demonstrated in a manufacturing contract
between SCI Systems and Apple Computer. There, Apple's volume purchase
commitment was conditioned on SCI (the supplier) providing Apple favorable
pricing as measured by comparable purchases made in the United States and sales
in other countries would not be considered in determining Apple's pricing.2x

b. Sales to government, school, or non-profit cltstomers. In some
industries it is common to offer special pricing to specific categories of

28

"OliN lAIN

M ~NlTAn 1'RI"(; ;\( ;RFF~IFN r

Illl \\TFN ;\1'1'1.1' COMPlITLR, INC. At\1J SCI SYSTEMS, I'll .•

c!. 3.2( i) (May 3 I. 1996), http://contracts.corporatc.tindlaw.coll1!agrccmcnts/applc/scis.ll1anu.1996.05.31.html
(last visitcd Jan. 2X, 20(5).
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customers. For example, if a supplier makes its latest digital service available to
public schools at a ninety percent discount (presumably at a loss), and assuming
that it intends to keep its employees on a salary continuation program, the
supplier needs to preserve its ability to make a profit by charging corporate
customers more that it might have otherwise.
c. Sales to intra-company or other cOlporate affiliates. Some companies
offer steep discounts when selling to customers or employees within the
company's corporate enterprise or when purchases are made by corporate affiliates.

d. Sales through difFerent distrihution channels. As described above, a
supplier's price for the samc product may vary markcdly bctwccn the various
types of channel

member~

e. Sales based

011

that purchase and distribute a product.

voilime or t)pe ofpllrchase. Even an extremely large

buycr that makcs no volume commitment and buys $10,000 worth of a product
would not typically merit a commitment to receive the same pricing benefits as
another buyer who has a multiycar, multimillion dollar purchase commitment. An
agrcement for Linuxcare to supply Linux-rclated support to Motorola addressed
this issue in an MFN clause stating that Motorola "shall be entitled to the most
favorable prices for serviccs for equivalent type and mlwlle of services."29
Therefore, the low-price commitment did not apply to sales to other Linuxcare
customers that vary in size from Motorola's.

29 MASTER OUTSOURCIN(i A(iREEMlNl, cI. (, (Dec. 13, 1999), http:i'contracts.corporate.tindlaw.collli
agreclllcntsilinuxcarcilllotoroia.scrv.1999.12.13.htllll (last visited .Ian. 2X, 2()05) (emphasis addcd) (thc contract
containing thc cxcmplary clausc was bctwcen Motorola, Inc. and Linuxeare, Inc.).
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As most suppliers are likely to have business practices that include at
least one of these justifications, in addition to other reasons for selling at different
prices, a supplier should usually avoid promising one customer the best price
offered to any other customer. With this in mind, a common supplier response to
a request for such a commitment is to simply reject the clause, perhaps with an
explanation of why an MFN commitment is not appropriate for the transaction.
Alternatively, the parties may negotiate the clause to renect the complexity of the
supplier's business model, with the supplier tailoring the clause to meet its
business circumstances. Typically, even the largest buyers will agree to either
eliminate or nalTow an MFN when faced with a reasoned explanation of how the
clause may create problems for the supplier or is not justified by the business
context. An instructive example of this is the Canadian government's standard
MFN clause for sole source purchasing refelTed to above:
The Offeror certi fies that the price quoted is not in excess of the
lowest price norl11([//), charged anyone else in Canada, including
its most favored Canadian customer,fc)/" like quality and quantity
of the Software Products and Related Scrviees. 30
When the government first started requesting that suppliers usc this
clause, it did not include the italicized qualifying phrases. In response to negotiations with suppliers, it adopted the above text, so that now the standard MFN
commitment applies only to "normal" pricing (and therefore not to occasional
promotions or other such conditions), only to sales in Canada, and only to sales
of similar "quality and quantity."

30 S('('

SOfI II'ARF ;\CC)IIJSITION RLFERFNn ("EN IRE.

slIpra notc 20 (cmphasis added).
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3. Antitrust
Commercial MFN clauses have been the focus of significant antitrust
enforcement activity under federal and state antitrust laws and in litigation
between private parties. 31 An MFN commitment can create antitrust concerns in
both horizontal relationships (such as among members of a healthcare or other
supplier network) and vertical markets (such as between an insurance company
and pal1ieipating physicians).32 One example of a federal enforcement action
comes from the pharmaceutical industry. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
issued a complaint against RxCare and the Tennessee Pharmacists Association,
alleging that an MFN clause in RxCare's contracts with the pharmacies was
illegally anticompetitive. 33 RxCare, a pharmacy billing and management services
company, filled prescriptions for patients covered by third-pal1y health insurance
plans. Participating pharmacies were reimbursed for the prescriptions at rates
negotiated directly with RxCare. The MFN clause stated that if the participating
pharmacy accepted a third-party reimbursement rate from any other entity that
was lower than the RxCare rate, the pharmacy must accept that lower rate for all
of its RxCare prescriptions. The FTC allegcd this had a negative impact on

31 s~~, eg., United States v. Med. Mut., No. I:ncv 2172, 199X U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2150g (N.D.
Ohio E. Div. Sept. 30,1998) (Department of Justice (DOl) settlement that enjoined insurance company hom
agreeing to or enforcing MFN provisions with participating hospitals); United States v. Vision Servo Plan. No.
I :94CV02693 TP J, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20930 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 1996) (in a settlement agreelllent VSP was
enjoined hom using MFN clauses in contracts with member optomctrists).
32 MFN clauses can raise antitrust COIH..:crns of a horizontal conspiracy among participating

providers in a health care network "which may fi.lSter collusive pricing hy creating an ctfeclive tloor on prices
." COMMI'~IS RU'ARIlI'l(' HrARIN(;S 0'< HLALTII CARe A:-;U
charged by the providers to all payors
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY, 2003 II.B.A. SEC. IINTITRL!Sr L. 24 (DEC. 18, 20(3), http://www.tic.gov/
os/comments/healthcarecol11ments2/aba.pdf(last visited lan. 2X, 2(05) [Hereinatier HEARI'I('S ON HFALIH CAR"
AND COMPETITlO'l LAW]. In a vertical relationship wherc a thin.l party payor "imposes MFN requirements on its
participating providers," one enforcement concern may be that "in some market circumstances prices to other
payors may be kept lip and barriers to entry raised." 1<1.
33 !d.
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consumer prIces because the RxCare pharmacies were discouraged from
agreeing to fill prescriptions at a rate lower than that offered hy RxCare. In 1996,
the parties signed a consent decrec that prohibitcd RxCare and the phamlacists
from agreeing to or enforcing MFN obligations, and RxCare agreed to remove
the clause from its existing contracts. 34
In United States

l'.

Delta Dental, a First Circuit court rejected insurer

Delta's argument that most MFN clauses have legitimate business justifications
and are per se legaJ.15 The court decided that in order to determine if the MFN
clause was antieompetitive, a fact-specific "rule of reason" analysis must be
conducted to establish whether "the anti competitive effects of [the MFN clause]
outweigh legitimate business justifications."36 The court conducted its own rule
of reason analysis and, relying largely on factors such as Delta's significant
market power and the laek of any price savings to Delta from the MFN clause, it
dismissed Delta's Rule l2(b)( 6) motion to dismiss. The government and Delta
subsequently agreed to a consent decree under which Delta was enjoined from
"maintaining, adopting, or enforcing any Most Favored Nation Clause or similar
provision in any Participating Dentist's Agreement, or by any other means or
methods."37 The MFN prohibition applied broadly to "any contractual provision,

3-/ In re RxCarc, Inc., 121 F.T.C. 762 (1996) (consent order); see a/so Press Release, Fcderal Trade
Commission, FTC Challenges "Most Favored Nation" Clause In Tennessee Pharmacy Network Contract (Jan.
19,1(96), a/ httpPwww.ttc.gov/opa!l996!OI/rxcare.htm (last visited Jan. 2X, 20(5).
35 Delta Dcnlal 1,943 F. Supp. at I R2 (denial of motion to dismiss): United States v. Delta Dcntal,
1997-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~71,X60 (D.R.1. July 2, 1(97) (consent decree) IDclta Dental II],
www.usdoj.gov /atr/eases/fllnO/IIH3.htm (iast visited Jan. 28, 20(5).

36 See Delta Dental I, 943 F. Supp. at In.
37 lei.
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policy, or practice which requires a dentist to charge Dclta no more than the
lowest fee charged by that dentist to any non-Delta plan or patient."3x
One antitrust commentator notes that in the healthcare industry "virtually
all of the MFN challenges instituted by either the DO] or state antitrust authorities have ended in consent decrees that expressly prohibited the use of MFN
clauses."39 He opines that "[I]f your antitrust client is realizing no meaningful
cost savings from its MFN clause, you can safely assume it will not survive
judicial, or DOJ scrutiny."411 This conclusion may be extreme, because it ignores
the need for a fact-specific "rule of reason" analysis that would also examine
issues such as the market power of the party with the MFN status, how the clause
affects cnd-user pricing, and whether the clause creates a barrier to entry for
competitors. A case in point was the Justice Department's antitrust enforcement
probe of online travel consortium Orbitz in 2003. An aspect of the investigation
was Orbitz's MFN clause, which prevented the participating airlines from
offering lower fares to other travel sites. The DOJ ultimately determined that it
could not show that the MFN clause led to higher travcl fares and violated
antitrust laws.')1

38 See Delta Dental II, 1997-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) '171.860. According to the eonsenl decree, the text
of Delta's MFN clause read, "'Delta Denial reserves the right to limit reimbursements to dentists to such levels
as such dentists have agreed to accept as reimbursement !i'OIn other non-governmental dental bencilts
reimbursement programs." 1<1.
39 Joseph A. Martin, Alllill'llsl .-//l{lil'si.\· oj "Mosl FOl'Orell Nalioll" ClouseI' III lim/Iii Core
COlllracls, PRIVATE AN IHRUST liliGArION NEIl s, fall 2000 A.B.A. SH. A'i 1111(liS r L., http://www.archer/aw.
com/articles/martin antitrust.pdf (last visited Jan. 28,20(5).

40 III.
41 Statement from the Assistant Attorney General R. Hewitt Pate Regarding the Closing of the
Orbitz Investigation, Department of Justice (July 31. 20(3), 01 www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press releases
/20()Y201208.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 20(5); see o/so Mark Berniker, ./uslice C"-,ors Orhil:: ill Allli-Trusl
I'mhe, FARiHIVERN[II'S.( '(lVI (Aug. I, 20(3). 01 http://ncws.earthwcb.COlll/bus-ncws/article.php/2243491 (last
visited Jan. 28, 20(5).
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Recognizing the complexity of this type of analysis, in late 2003, the
ABA Antitrust Law Section asked the FTC to issue formal guidance statements
to clarify the characteristics of an MFN clause and the specific market variables
that affect whether an MFN clause would be construed as anticompetitive. 42
From the various court decisions addressing whether an MFN clause
illegally violates state or federal antitrust laws, the clearest conclusion to be
drawn is that an MFN clause by itself is neither per se legally pennissive nor per

se illegally antieompetitive. 4 .l The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Justice
Department (DOJ) similarly advises that:
While not all MFNs violate the antitrust laws, they can, under
certain market conditions, discourage provider discounting,
deter innovation, and reduce meaningful consumer choices in
health plans, either by faci litating collusive pricing among
competing providers or by discouraging providers from offering
lower rates or more cost-effective care to rival plans. 44
Particularly within the context of a transaction where one of the parties
possesses significant market power, or within an industry that has received
antitrust enforcement attention, a lawyer evaluating a proposed MFN eommitment may need to master, or seek advice regarding, applicable state and federal
antitrust laws and enforcement actions. Subsequently, a rule of reason analysis

42 HEARIr\(;S ON HEAlTH CAR~ AND COMPfcllfiON LAW, .I'llI'm note 32, at 25. As of the date this
article was written, the FTC had not provided any further guidance.

43 See. e.g.. Willametle Dental Group. PC v. Or. Dcntal Servo Corp., 882 P.2d (,37 (Or. App. 1994).
"'[Cjourts should not adopt a per se rule regarding MFN clauses, hut should carefully examine the alleged
anticompctitive clfects of each challenged clause." U.S. V. Delta Dental. 943 F. Supp. 172. 182 (D.R.I. 1996)
[Della Dental 1[; see 111.1'0 Blue Cross & Blue Shield Utd. V. Marshlield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995)
(emphasizing legitimate husiness rcason Il>r MFN clause at issue); Ocean State Physicians Health Plan v. Blue
Cross and Blue Shield. 883 F2d 1101 (1st ('ir. 1989). cal. denied. 494 U.S. 1027 (1990) (Iinding that the
insurer had legitimate business reason for MFN clause in contracts with participating physicians).
44 U.S DOJ. AN III RliST DIVISION, HEALtIl CARl'. TASK hmn. RECF'! r ENFORCEMENT AcrIONS,
www.usdoj.goviatripuhlic/health_carc /2044.htm (last visited Jan. 28. 20(5) (sec MFN Clauses section).
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may be engaged in to determine what type of MFN clause, if any, would be
legally permissible in the client's context. However, it may be a more efficient
use of time to simply explain to the client that an MFN commitment creatcs on
one hand the concern of a material risk of antitrust violation, and on the other, a
significant time necessary to research and analyzc the scope of that risk. These
two concems alone can discourage some paliies from making MFN commitments altogether.
C. A Checklist.for Negotiating

WI

MFN Clause

Drawing on the discussion abovc, the following is a summary of the common
negotiation points that should be considered in dealing with a commercial MFN
clause. Part I lists factors that may be relevant in communicating rejection of a
request for an MFN commitment. P31i 2 lists clements to consider when negotiating the content of a specific MFN clause. Finally, an example is listed of an
MFN clause that contains clarifications commonly negotiated that can make an
MFN commitment mutually palatable in certain circumstances.
1. Rejecting a buyer\· request/iJl· A4FN status

A buyer usually has business reasons for seeking MFN status from a
supplier. Where a supplier finds an MFN clause unacceptable and an initial polite
but unexplained rejection of the clause is insufficient, it can be effective to
address the business objective underlying the buyer's request. While the specific
content of the supplier's arguments will come ti·om the details of the transaction
at hand, the following key concepts may be useful for attorneys in rejecting a
buyer's request for an MFN commitment.
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a . .JlIstifi, the price. Explain why the pricing for the proposed transaction

(which may have already been the subject of vigorous negotiation) is fair and
advantageous to the buyer--without an MFN commitment. This may involve
providing price comparisons with competitors or pointing out that the supplier
has won a competitive bid, thus providing market validation of the supplier's
price and quality. If applicable, it may be useful to remind a buyer that the
volume of its purchases docs not justify additional special pricing treatment.

h. Explain the total package. Price is just one element of the transaction.
Remind the buyer of the supplier's other advantages (such as superior quality,
faster service, or delivery commitments) in comparison to the buyer's altell1atives.
c. Isolating the business objective. Especially ifnegotiation over an MFN
clause has stalled, it is necessary to identify the main reason a party is seeking
MFN status. Once the attoll1ey understands the impetus for the MFN request,
details from the specific context of the transaction can be used to address the
concell1.

d. Inability to comply. It may be impractical or virtually impossible for
the supplier to comply because of the difficulty of administering an MFN
commitment (i.e., variations in a supplier's pricing to channel members or end
users ).

e. Competitil'e restrictions. An MFN commitment may restrict a
company's ability to effectively compete in its market. Also, in some situations,
a supplier may be unwilling to, or contractually prohibited from, disclosing to
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onc buycr information regarding the pI;ees at which other buyers purchase the
supplier's products/services.

f Antitrust risks.

An MFN clause may violate state or federal antitrust

laws. At the very least, it may concern a supplier enough to feel that it needs to
expend significant resources evaluating the antitrust risks associated with the
proposed MFN clause. Antitrust risk is of more concern where one of the parties
has a large market share, where the MFN clause has an identifiable effect on end
user pricing, or where it creates a barrier to entry for the supplier's competitors.

g. Corporate policy. For the reasons discussed in this article, many
companies have established firm corporate policies against granting buyers MFN
status. An interesting stand-otT may occur when a supplier with a corporate
policy against granting M FN status attempts to contract with a buyer whose
purchasing organization has a policy of demanding MFN status. That is where the
creative lawyer who understands both pat1ies' business objectives and concerns
earns her money.45

45 S('(!, e.g .. STRAIH;I(' AU.IANn. ANIl MAS ITR SI'Rvlns A(,REl·.~IH\T (Apr. I, 19(9),
http://contracts.corporate.tindluw.com/ugrecments/akamui/apple.msa.1999.04.0 I.html (last visited Jan. 28,
2(05) (contract betwcen Akamai Technologies Inc. and Apple Computer Inc.). This agreemcnt may provide an
example of a company simply telling another that as a matter of corporate policy it docs not agree to MI'N
clauses. The agrcement contained no MFN clause, but stated:
In the cvent that Akamai grants to any other party "'low price assurance" or similar type
arrangemcnt with respect to the FreeFlow Services, , . then Akamai shall immediately
disclose and otter such morc t'lvorablc terms or pricing to Apple, provided however, in
order to receive more favorable prices or terms, Apple must accept all of the same
material aspects of the terms and conditions offered to sllch third party (monetary and
non-monetary),
1<1. at cl. 7.1. This provisioIl sccms to provide a window to a ncgotiation in which Apple pushed hard for all
MFN clause, but was successfully rebutted by Akal1lai's finn stand and assertioll that it never agrees to MFN
clauses with anyone (at least regarding thc services at issLle), In the end Apple settled ttlr the above clause which
basically says, "if sOllle day down the road you do give an MFN clause to SOl11eOl1e. you'll otrer us the same
concession." 5'ec ill.
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If the parties reach a negotiating impasse at this point, the most efTective
way to break through can often be a frank business conversation between the
parties' decision makers that lays bare the business motivations and concerns
behind their positions. At the same time, it can help to buttress the negotiating
position if the supplier's attorney has knowledge of past purchasing contracts that
the buyer has agreed to, or, failing that, similar contracts entered into by entities
within the buyer's industry.

2. Negotiating an MFN commitment
In most transactions where the supplier is willing to grant some form of an
MFN guarantee to a buyer, the lawyer needs to ensure that the MFN clause is
tailored to t·he business justification for the clause and applies only to sales that
arc reasonably comparable to the buyer's situation. In line with these objectives,
the following are common issues that should be considered in reviewing or
drafting the text of an MFN commitment.

a. Ensure the right comparisol1s. The scope of an MFN commitment
should reflect the complexities of the buyer's business model. To accomplish
this, many MFN clauses apply only to similarly situated customers contracting
for similar volumes under the same terms and conditions. Some specific comparisons to be aware of arc as follows.

1. International sales. To illustrate, the cost of a servIce

111

Eastern Europe may be half of its U.S. cost because of lower labor costs, and the
price of a discretionary pharmaceutical drug or device may vary by country in
relation to the average per capita income.
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2. Sales throllgh different distrihution channe/s. The prices for
OEM's, distributors, resellers, and end users arc usually different. If thc buyer
claims not to understand or carc about this, a lawycr can providc a quick primcr
on product distribution through a channel.
3. Volume discOlilltS. It is easy to explain to the buyer making a
small purchase that it should not be granted a unique pricing condition. A lawycr
also needs to negotiatc with a large buyer making a significant volume commitment, as the supplier will still want to preserve

flexibility to make future

decisions.
4. Special promotiol1s. One-time and special temporary
promotions should be excluded from any MFN commitment. This can be
accomplished with a reference in the clause to "normal" or "standard" pricing.
5. Government, school, and I/oll-pro/it sales. As an extreme
example, a company give-away to benefit inner-city schools should not force the
supplier to offer the same prices to the Walt Disney Company.
b. Rovard performance. Granting an MFN commitment can be as real a
pricing concession as reducing a buyer's price by a certain percentage. Ask for a
buyer commitment that justifies the concession: i.e., "If you [make an initial
purchase of $100 million, standardize throughout your enterprise on our system,
etc.], we'll offer this type of an MFN commitment."
c. Reciprocity. Takc a lcsson fi'om thc World Tradc Organization with its

reciprocal international treaties. Where it would be advantageous to the supplier,
seek to broaden the MFN commitment to provide a reciprocal benefit to the
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supplier. This can help a buyer to think more broadly about its demand for an
MFN commitment.
d. Audit. It is best to avoid a buyer's ability to audit the pricing granted

to a supplier's purchasers. At a minimum, any audit clause should prevent a buyer
from accessing confidential or proprietary information of the supplier's
customers. This can be accomplished by allowing only a third-party accounting
firm to conduct the audit and narrowly defining the scope of information the
auditor can disclose to the buyer.

e. Minimize administrative hassles. To ensure the supplier can comply
with an MFN clause, limit the price commitment to the supplier's standard price
list or some other metric that requires little or no extra processes to ensure
continued compliance. This is a common feature in negotiated MFN clauses
through references to a supplier's "standard" pricing.

f

Minimize antitrust risks. The means for accomplishing this depends on

the context of the specific transaction. The safest path is no MFN commitment at
all , but most antitrust risk can normally be avoided if an MFN clause is merely
a representation regarding how the buyer's price compares to its standard prices
or to prices given other suppliers up to that date, and does not apply to individual
customer pricing made in future contracts.
g. The present beats past and filtllre. If an MFN commitment

IS

appropriate, it is often easiest to administer and comply with if it applies to the
pricing that has been agreed to in current contracts. If it is extended to past or
future deals, the antitrust risks from the commitment increase.
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h. Reasonable time limits. If an MFN clause does need to apply to future
sales to other buyers, the time period should be reasonably limited. If a supply
contract's initial term is renewable, for example, it is best to limit the MFN
commitment to the first term only. IBM's restrictive approach as the supplier in
a contract with Uniphase was to limit the MFN commitment to sales made
"during the preceding twelve (12) months to any other non-IBM customer
purchasing equivalent quantities .... "~(,
i. CO/porale policy. Explain to the buyer the reason for the supplier's

policy against agreeing to MFN clauses, or at least to MFN clauses with celtain
objectionable elements. If the supplier has not developed a consistent corporate
policy, see Sections A and B above.
III.

CONCLUSION

The business lawyer can best assist a client in negotiating an MFN clause
by paying attention to business justifications for, and potential problems resulting
from, such a commitment. The above discussion argues that an MFN commitment is not appropriate in many sophisticated commercial transactions. Where
both parties agree that an MFN clause is appropriate, the commitment should be
tailored to meet agreed-to objectives and avoid unnecessary business risks. The
following sample provision shows the type of qualifiers often agreed to in MFN
clauses and illustratcs the factors discussed in this article:

46 TECII~OLO(;Y LICENsl' A(;REEMI,~ I, cl. 2.12 (Mar. 10, 1997), http://contracts.corporatc.tindlaw
.com/agreemenls/uniphasc/ibm.techlic.1997.0J.IO.htl11l (last visited Jun. 2X, 200S) (the contract was entered
into by IBM Corporation and Uniphase Corporation).
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Supplier warrants that the prices under this agreement are equal
to or less than standard prices offered by Supplier generally to
similarly situated customers contracting for similar volumes
under the same terms and conditions.
Of course, as illustrated by this article, this clause cannot cover many,
nor perhaps, even most situations. Many suppliers simply need the freedom to
treat differently even similarly situated customers purchasing like quantities.
Furthermore, some circumstances will justify an MFN provision with fewer
qualifications.
This article began with a little history of the use of MFN agreements
between nations. The criminal imperialism of the West in nineteenth century
China was an atrocity so monstrous that there is no real analogue between forcing
China to grant unilateral MFN status and contemporary commercial transactions.
Instead, the lesson to extrapolate from the international treaties discussed may be
simply that a supplier should take care to avoid unilateral commitments that
constrict its ability to make decisions in a dynamic business environment. For the
situation where both supplier and buyer agree to negotiate an MFN commitment,
by considering the concepts discussed above, the attorney can negotiate so as to
maximize the client's ability to compete and minimize the risks of administrative
burden, contract breach, or illegal behavior.
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